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Francesco Giavazzi, IGIER–Università Bocconi and NBER
Reinhart and Reinhart offer an important contribution to our understand-
ing of the effects of large capital inflows. The algorithm they develop
allows us to classify and analyze episodes of capital inflow bonanzas
in a very large sample of countries, both advanced and emerging econo-
mies. The sample includes 181 countries during 1980–2007 and a subset
of 66 over 1960–2007. It is the largest so far analyzed in the literature. I
have two small concerns with the paper and one more interesting query.
Let us start by considering the results for advanced economies. As the
authors themselves say, the results for this group of countries are less
stark than for developing economies. They also seem to be driven by a
few odd observations concerning not the definition of “bonanzas,” but
of their effects. In the data (table 6) most euro area countries appear to
have experienced a currency crash (defined as an annual depreciation
vs.theU.S.dollarof15%ormore)in2005.During2005theeurodepreciated
against the dollar 12%, but beyondthe size of the depreciation—which is
below the 15% threshold—it is unclear whether one should relate the de-
preciation of the common European currency to the three bonanza epi-
sodesthatoccurredwithinaperiodspanningtheprevious3years:France,
Portugal, and Spain (table 3). The weakening of the euro in 2005 mostly
mirrored the divergence in growth between the euro area and the United
States: it had little to do with the three bonanza episodes. I am similarly
puzzled by two episodes of banking crises: France in 1994–95 and Italy in
1990–95. Although both events fit the definition of a banking crisis given
in table 5, it is unclear whether one should relate them to a previous bo-
nanza. In France the episode corresponds to the government recapitali-
zationof CréditLyonnais,astate‐ownedbankthatranintotroublewhen
it became known that, as a result of a financial scandal, it had become
the de facto owner of Metro‐Goldwyn‐Mayer, the world’s most famous
moviestudio.InItalyitcorrespondstothestatebailoutof BancodiNapoli,
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related to large inflows of foreign capital since both banks were state
owned, thus closed to foreign investors. The significance of the results
for high‐income countries reported in table 7 is likely to be even smaller
if these episodes were excluded.
On the role of domestic fiscal policy as a potential amplifier during
episodes of bonanzas—my second small point—I share Roberto Rigobon’s
(2005) reservations about the identification of the procyclicality of gov-
ernment spending in a previous paper by one of the authors.
My more interesting query concerns the authors’ view that the cycles
in asset prices often associated with episodes of bonanzas should be con-
sidered a drawback of such episodes. Are they really? There is a new—
a n di nm yv i e wv e r yi n t e r e s t i n g —literature that suggests that large cycles
in asset prices, “bubbles,” are not necessarily to be avoided. Olivier
(2000), for instance, suggests that speculative bubbles on equity prices,
by raising the market value of firms, encourage entrepreneurship, firm
creation, investment, and growth. He points to a number of technologi-
cal breakthroughs that moved from the stage of a technical innovation
to the stage of a new widely used technology thanks to the inflow of
capital induced by the emergence of a bubble on the assets of the firms
involved in the innovation. Caballero, Fahri, and Hammour (2006) in-
vestigate the feedback from increased growth to a decline in the long‐
run effective cost of capital, a mechanism through which “bubbles” can
sustain growth. The association between bonanzas and bubbles that the
authors identifyis interesting per se: we disagree only (andto a very lim-
ited extent, since many bubbles, especially on real estate, are indeed a
costly waste) on the assessment of the effects of a bubble.
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